Investment Management

Posted on Wednesday, March 8 2017 at 10:41 am by

SEC Issues Guidance to Ease Fund Implementation of “Clean Shares”

By Andrew Sachs and John I Sanders

In January, we authored a post[i] discussing an SEC no-action letter, dated January 11, 2017, to Capital Group (the “Capital Group Letter”), the parent company of American Funds.[ii]  In the Capital Group Letter, the SEC agreed that Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”), which prohibits selling securities except at “a current public offering price described in the prospectus”, does not apply to brokers when acting as agent on behalf of its customers and charging customers commissions for effecting transactions in so-called “Clean Shares”.[iii]

Clean shares are mutual fund shares stripped of any front-end load, deferred sales charge, or other asset-based fee for sales or distribution that are sold by brokers who set their own commissions in connection with such sales.[iv]  We noted in January that the ability to replace the distribution fees typically charged by its mutual funds with commissions charged by a broker would give funds a new measure of flexibility to meet the demands of the Fiduciary Rule and competition generally, and we anticipated that many mutual fund companies would explore the concept of Clean Shares.

On February 15, 2017, just a month after publication of the Capital Group Letter, the SEC was compelled to issue guidance (the “FAQ”) addressing some of the questions it had received from mutual fund companies to-date.[v]  Below, we summarize FAQ as it relates to Funds seeking to implement Clean Shares.

Initial Implementation of Clean Shares

A mutual fund company issuing Clean Shares must, of course, amend its registration statement to include disclosure of the new share class.  Such an amendment might be affected through a Rule 485(a) filing or through a Rule 485(b) filing, depending on whether the amendment is “material”.[vi]  Typically, funds prefer Rule 485(b) filings because they become effective immediately,[vii] while Rule 485(a) filings are subject to a 60 day review.[viii]

In the FAQ, the SEC confirmed that “Funds should create these new Clean Shares, like any new class, by making a filing under Rule 485(a).”  To minimize the burdens of filing under Rule 485(a), if the only disclosures being amended are those describing the new share class, we advise mutual fund companies to seek selective review of the Rule 485(a) filing.  The request for a selective review should be made in the cover letter accompanying the 485(a) filing and must include (i) a statement as to whether the disclosure in the filing has been reviewed by the staff in another context; (ii) a statement identifying prior filings that the registrant considers similar to, or intends as precedent for, the current filing; (iii) a summary of the material changes made in the current filing from the previous filings; and (iv) any specific areas that the registrant believes warrant the SEC staff’s particular attention.[ix]

Adding Clean Shares to Multiple Funds

A mutual fund family adding Clean Shares to multiple funds need not file Rule 485(a) filings for each fund.  Instead, the FAQ confirms that mutual funds companies introducing Clean Shares across multiple funds can request Template Filing Relief pursuant to Rule 485(b)(i)(vii).  A registrant requesting Template Filing Relief would make a single Rule 485(a) filing with a Template Filing Relief request for all other funds with “substantially identical disclosure”.[x]

We note, however, that a request for Template Filing Relief must include (i) the reason for making the post-effective amendment; (ii) the identity of the Template filing;[xi] (iii) the identity of the registration statements that intend to rely on the relief (“Replicate filings”).[xii]  Additionally, the registrant must represent to the SEC that (i) the disclosure changes in the template filing are substantially identical to disclosure changes that will be made in the replicate filings; (ii) the replicate filings will incorporate changes made to the disclosure included in the Template filing to resolve any staff comments thereon; and (iii) the replicate filings will not include any other changes that would otherwise render them ineligible for filing under rule 485(b).[xiii]  Selective Review and Template Filing Relief can save registrants adding Clean Shares to existing funds time and money.

Existing Share Classes Qualify as Clean Shares

One of the more interesting aspects of the FAQ was the acknowledgement by the SEC that certain existing share classes of funds (such as institutional class shares) might already meet the requirements of Clean Shares, thereby offering a path to offering Clean Shares to many registrants without a Rule 485(a) filing.[xiv] In such a case, the SEC noted that a 485(a) filing would not be necessary “solely to add the prospectus disclosure described in the [Capital Group Letter]”[xv] where the fund already offers a share class that meets the requirements of the Capital Group Letter.[xvi]  Instead, a Rule 485(b) or Rule 497 filing will suffice.

Conclusion

The introduction of Clean Shares to the mutual fund industry presents an opportunity for mutual fund companies to improve the competitive position of their products, and we anticipate that there will be continued interest in Clean Shares even if the Department of Labor’s Conflict of Interest Rule does not become effective.[xvii]  If you have questions about Clean Shares of the SEC’s recent guidance, we encourage you to contact us.

 

[i] Andrew Sachs and John I. Sanders, Effects of the DOL Fiduciary Rule Reach Mutual Fund Industry, Kilpatrick Townsend: Investment Management News and Notes (Jan. 27, 2017), http://blogs.kilpatricktownsend.com/investmentmanagement/.

[ii] SEC, Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Investment Management, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2017/capital-group-011117-22d.htm (“Capital Group Letter”).

[iii] Id.

[iv] John Waggoner, Brace for Thousands of New DOL Fiduciary-Friendly Mutual Fund Share Classes, INVESTMENT NEWS (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170106/FREE/170109955/brace-for-thousands-of-new-dol-fiduciary-friendly-mutual-fund-share.

[v] SEC, Frequently Asked Questions on IM Guidance Update 2016-06 (Mutual Fund Fee Structures, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/frequently-asked-questions-mutual-fund-fee-structures.htm (“FAQ”).

[vi] 17 CFR 230.485(a)-(b) (2017).

[vii] 17 CFR 230.485(b) (2017).

[viii] 17 CFR 230.485(a) (2017).

[ix] SEC: IM Guidance 2016-06, available at https://www.sec.gov.

[x] Id.

[xi] This identifying information should include the name of the Fund and the registrant, the Securities Act file number, and the filing date of the rule 485(a) filing.

[xii] This identifying information should include the name of the registrant, the Securities Act file number, and the series and class name for each of the Funds that intend to rely on the relief.

[xiii] SEC: IM Guidance 2016-06, available at https://www.sec.gov.

[xiv] FAQ, supra note 7.

[xv] Id. at Question 5.

[xvi] See, Capital Group Letter, supra note 2 (Listing the registrant’s representations to the SEC:  The broker will represent in its selling agreement with the fund’s underwriter that it is acting solely on an agency basis for the sale of Clean Shares; The Clean Shares sold by the broker will not include any form of distribution-related payment to the broker; The fund’s prospectus will disclose that an investor transacting in Clean Shares may be required to pay a commission to a broker, and if applicable, that shares of the fund are available in other share classes that have different fees and expenses; The nature and amount of the commissions and the times at which they would be collected would be determined by the broker consistent with the broker’s obligations under applicable law, including but not limited to applicable FINRA and Department of Labor rules; and Purchases and redemptions of Clean Shares will be made at net asset value established by the fund (before imposition of a commission).

[xvii] Paul Foley and John I. Sanders, Department of Labor Set to Eliminate the Fiduciary Rule, JD SUPRA (March 3, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/department-of-labor-set-to-eliminate-92801/.

Posted on Thursday, March 2 2017 at 3:13 pm by

Department of Labor Set to Eliminate the Fiduciary Rule

On March 2, 2017, the DOL proposed to extend the applicability date of the Department of Labor (“DOL”) Conflict of Interest Rule (the “Fiduciary Rule”) from April 10, 2017 for 60 days.[1]  The proposal states that the extension will make it possible for the DOL to take additional steps (e.g., propose rescission of the Fiduciary Rule) without the Fiduciary Rule becoming applicable.[2]  The DOL states that this approach is being taken so that “advisers, investors and other stakeholders would be spared the risk and expense of facing two major changes in regulatory environment.”[3]  This delay follows the Presidential Memorandum, sent by President Trump on February 3, 2017, that directed the DOL to examine whether the Fiduciary Rule would “adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice.”[4]  Considering the language contained in the Presidential Memorandum and the text of DOL’s release, we do not believe the Fiduciary Rule is long for this world.

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York and Winston-Salem offices. John I. Sanders is an associate based in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

[1] Department of Labor,  Conflict of Interest Rule – Retirement Investment Advice; Proposed Rule; Extension of Applicability Date (March 1, 2017), available at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.  The DOL was instructed to consider the following three questions in the course of its examination:  (1) whether the anticipated applicability of the final rule has harmed or is likely to harm investors due to a reduction of Americans’ access to certain retirement savings offerings, retirement product structures, retirement savings information, or related financial advice; (2) whether the anticipated applicability of the final rule has resulted in dislocations or disruptions within the retirement services industry that may adversely affect investors or retirees; and (3) whether the final rule is likely to cause an increase in litigation, and an increase in the prices that investors and retirees must pay to gain access to retirement services.  President Trump directed that if the DOL makes an affirmative determination as to any of the three inquiries or otherwise finds the Fiduciary Rule is incompatible with President Trump’s desire “to empower Americans to make their own financial decisions,” then the DOL is to publish for notice and comment rulemaking a proposal to revise or rescind the Fiduciary Rule.

Posted on Friday, January 27 2017 at 10:34 am by

Effects of the DOL Fiduciary Rule Reach Mutual Fund Industry

By Andrew Sachs and John I. Sanders

The Department of Labor finalized the so-called “Fiduciary Rule” in April 2016 and announced it would go into effect in April 2017.[i]  Since the finalization of the Fiduciary Rule, the annuities,[ii] brokerage,[iii] and advisory industries[iv] have all seen substantial changes to products or fee structures.  Now, the effects of the rule have reached the mutual fund industry as well, with the SEC’s recent approval of American Funds’ “Clean Shares” – shares stripped of any front-end load, deferred sales charge, or other asset-based fee for sales or distribution that are sold by brokers who set their own commissions in connection with such sales.[v]

On January 11th, the SEC issued a no-action letter to Capital Group, the parent company of American Funds.[vi]  The no-action letter stated that the SEC concurred with Capital Group’s view that Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”), which prohibits selling securities except at “a current public offering price described in the prospectus,” does not apply to brokers when acting as agent on behalf of its customers and charging customers commissions for effecting transactions in Clean Shares.[vii]

At least one publication predicts that thousands of mutual funds will create similar classes of shares.[viii]  We believe that the ability to replace the distribution fees typically charged by its mutual funds with commissions charged by the broker will give funds a new measure of flexibility to meet the demands of the Fiduciary Rule and competition generally.  For those wishing to more fully understand the costs and benefits of adopting a similar share class, we are here to help.

Andrew Sachs is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s Winston-Salem office. John I. Sanders is an associate in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

 

[i] Department of Labor, Fact Sheet: Department of Labor Finalizes Rule to Address Conflicts of Interest in Retirement Advice, Saving Middle Class Families Billions of Dollars Every Year, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/dol-final-rule-to-address-conflicts-of-interest.

[ii] Greg Iacurci, Insurers Developing Fee-Based Fixed-Index Annuities Post-DOL Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENT NEWS (July 14, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160714/FREE/160719964/insurers-developing-fee-based-fixed-indexed-annuities-post-dol.

[iii] Katherine Chiglinsky and Margaret Collins, AIG CEO Blames Obama Retirement Rule for Broker-Dealer Exit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/aig-broker-dealer-exit-fueled-by-obama-retirement-rule-ceo-says.

[iv] Darla Mercado, How the New “Fiduciary” Rule Will Actually Affect You, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/13/how-the-new-fiduciary-rule-will-actually-affect-you.html.

[v] John Waggoner, Brace for Thousands of New DOL Fiduciary-Friendly Mutual Fund Share Classes, INVESTMENT NEWS (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170106/FREE/170109955/brace-for-thousands-of-new-dol-fiduciary-friendly-mutual-fund-share.

[vi] SEC, Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Investment Management, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2017/capital-group-011117-22d.htm.

[vii] Id.

[viii] Waggoner, supra note 5.

Posted on Tuesday, January 24 2017 at 3:08 pm by

Constitutionality of SEC Judges Questioned

By Paul Foley and John I. Sanders

Among the many provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act were some that gave the SEC greater ability to hear cases and levy punishments in internal administrative courts without resort to ordinary federal courts.[i]  These provisions resulted in alarming results, including a 90% success rate for the SEC in front of its own newly-minted administrative law judges.[ii]  For comparative purposes, the SEC’s previous success rate was below 70%.[iii]

A legal challenge brought against the SEC argued that these judges are “inferior officers” that, pursuant to the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution,[iv] must be appointed by an executive branch member and approved by the Senate.  Because such steps were never taken, the judges’ actions would be unconstitutional if they are, in fact, found to be “inferior officers”.  The 10th Circuit has agreed with the plaintiffs, but the SEC is expected to appeal.[v]

If the challenge is ultimately successful, there will be two significant impacts.  First, the cases decided by the SEC’s judges may be void.  Second, the SEC will be forced to use the old, less certain procedure of bringing enforcement actions in federal district court.  If you’d like to know more, I encourage you to read a succinct review of the matter in today’s Wall Street Journal.[vi]

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York and Winston-Salem, North Carolina offices.  John I. Sanders is an associate based in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

[i] Giles D. Beal IV, Judge, Jury, and Executioner:  SEC Administrative Law Judges Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. Banking Inst. 413 (2016), available at https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=20+N.C.+Banking+Inst.+413&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=e7ef73edd6e64a6ec56e122360340a35.

[ii] Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, Wall St. Journal (May 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.

[iii] Id.

[iv] U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.

[v] Alison Frankel, 10th Circuit Strikes Down SEC ALJ Regime, Debates Reach to Other Agencies, Reuters (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/otc-sec-idUSKBN14H1S3.

[vi] David B. Rivkin Jr. and Andrew M. Grossman, When is a Judge Not Really a Judge?, Wall St. Journal (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/when-is-a-judge-not-really-a-judge-1485215998.

Posted on Thursday, December 15 2016 at 9:28 am by

Supreme Court Confirms Expansive View of Insider Trading

By Paul Foley, Clay Wheeler, and John Sanders

Perhaps the most serious charge that could be leveled against a reader of this blog is that of being engaged in or associated with “insider trading.”  The allegation alone is enough to derail or end a promising career.  Successful compliance requires an understanding of the law and your obligations under it.  In light of recent developments regarding insider trading, including the first Supreme Court decision to address the crime in 20 years,[1] we encourage you to read this article in its entirety and contact us with any questions you may have.

Insider Trading:  The Tradition

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[2] and Rule 10b-5[3] promulgated thereunder prohibit insider trading.  The basic elements of insider trading are:  (i) engaging in a securities transaction, (ii) while in possession of material, non-public information, (iii) in violation of a duty to refrain from doing so.

The paradigm case discussing the so-called “classical” theory of insider trading is Chiarella v. U.S.[4]  In Chiarella, an employee of a publishing firm was charged with insider trading after using advance notice of a takeover bid to trade.  Chiarella’s conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court after the Court focused on the requirement of a duty running from the trader to the shareholders of the corporate entity “owning” the material, non-public information.  Thus, a successful prosecution under the classical theory usually involves a corporate insider trading in shares of his or her employer while in possession of material, non-public information (e.g., advance notice of a merger).

After Chiarella, an important development in the law has been the extension of liability to persons who receive tips from insiders, i.e., individuals whose duty to refrain from trading is derived or inherited from the corporate insider’s duty.  Thus, not only may insiders be liable for insider trading under rule 10b-5, but those to whom they pass tips, either directly (tippees) or through others (remote tippees) may be liable if they trade on such tips.  Because tippee and remote tippee liability is more difficult to grasp and more likely to affect our readers, this article will primarily, but not exclusively, focus on individuals in those circumstances.

In a pattern that has repeated itself over the years, courts broadened the scope of insider trading by developing a second, “complementary”[5] theory of insider trading – the “misappropriation” theory.  This theory “targets person[s] who are not corporate insiders but to whom material non-public information has been entrusted in confidence and who breach a fiduciary duty to the source of the information to gain personal profit in the securities market.”[6]  The seminal case in the articulation of the misappropriation theory is U.S. v. O’Hagan.  In O’Hagan, a partner at a large law firm (but not ours) obtained and traded on information given to attorneys in the firm who were representing a client in a tender offer.  The Supreme Court held that “A person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”[7]  In practical terms, under the misappropriation theory, individuals who come into possession of material, non-public information while providing services to corporate clients, such as the attorney in O’Hagan [8] may be held liable.

Joining Chiarella and O’Hagan in making up the traditional core of insider trading law is Dirks v. SEC.[9]  In Dirks, the Supreme Court attempted to set a limit on the scope of insider trading.[10]  Dirks was a securities analyst who learned from a former insurance company insider that the company was committing fraud and was on the verge of financial ruin.[11]  Dirks investigated and disclosed this information to several people, including a reporter and clients who traded on the information.[12]  Dirks was held liable for insider trading, but appealed.[13]  The overturning of Dirks’s liability centered on the fact that the corporate insider had disclosed the fraud to Dirks purely by a desire to expose the fraud, rather than to obtain any financial or other personal benefit.  The Court held:

In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider’s “tip” constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.  Whether disclosure is a breach of duty depends in large part on the personal benefit the insider receives as a result of the disclosure.  Absent an improper purpose, there is no breach of duty to stockholders.  And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.[14]

Furthermore, Dirks introduced the idea that a tippee has to be actually aware of the tipper’s breach or presented with sufficient facts so that the tippee will be deemed aware.  In this way, Dirks created a “personal benefit” element related to the tipper.  After Dirks, prosecutors were generally confident they could prove this benefit existed as long as there was a quid pro quo or a moderately close relationship between tipper and tippee.

Newman:  A Disruption

Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks guided the law of insider trading largely uninterrupted for nearly 20 years.  Then came a decision from the Second Circuit, the so-called “Mother Court”[15] of securities law, but an underling of the Supreme Court, called U.S. v. Newman.[16]

Newman involved a hedge fund portfolio manager who was part of an information-sharing cohort of analysts and portfolio managers.[17]  By the time Newman received the tip, he was “four levels removed from the insider tippers,” (i.e., a remote tippee).[18]  The tippers were insiders at technology companies who had provided information to what the court termed “casual acquaintances,” who in turn passed those tips on.  Citing Dirks repeatedly for support, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that government must prove the tipper received “a personal benefit” and that the tippee knew of that benefit.[19]

In Newman, the Second Circuit concluded that “the mere fact of friendship” was insufficient to give rise to the required personal benefit to the tipper.  Instead, the court required “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”  Despite the fact that the 2nd Circuit cited its adherence to Dirks in overturning Newman’s conviction, it was clear to all that by raising the bar for the evidence required to meet the Dirks “personal benefit” requirement, the opinion suggested a serious new limitation on insider trading law.  Moreover, the prosecutors were denied a rehearing en banc and a Supreme Court writ of certiorari.  This meant Newman would remain law in the most significant federal circuit for securities law until further notice.

One attorney called Newman “a well-deserved generational setback for the Government.”[20]  The predicted effect of Newman was that the government would be forced to prove that someone charged with insider trading knew that she was trading on non-public, material information and that “the tipper’s goal in disclosing information is to obtain money, property, or something of tangible value.”[21]  This heightened burden led to the reversal of more than a dozen insider trading convictions,[22] and pending cases were dropped.[23]

Salman:  The Expansive View of Insider Trading Strikes Back

Newman’s holding concerning what qualifies as a personal benefit to the tipper was reversed last week when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Salman v. United States.[24]  Before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, in Salman, only the most ardent securities law gurus followed the case.  So, some background may be helpful.  Salman was convicted after trading on material, non-public information received from a friend, who had received the information from Salman’s brother-in-law.  Thus, Salman was prosecuted as a remote tippee.  He argued that he could not “be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his brother-in-law, who worked on M&A matters at an investment bank) did not personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips.”[25]

In a strong rebuke, the Supreme Court held, “To the extent that the Second Circuit in Newman held that the tipper must also receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to a trading relative, that rule is inconsistent with Dirks.[26]  Justice Alito succinctly explained “a tippee’s liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty” and that duty is breached “when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal benefit.”[27]  Such a personal benefit can be inferred where the tip is made “to a trading relative or friend.”[28]

Why Salman Matters

By allowing a generous inference of a benefit to the tipper based on a personal relationship alone, the Supreme Court in Salman reestablished the old order of things – an expansive scope for insider trading prosecutions.  We understand that investment advisers are more likely than others to come into contact with corporate insiders, as well as those with whom corporate insiders speak in confidence.  You know these individuals as professionals, former schoolmates, and even friends and family members.  In discussing your work, it is quite possible that non-public, material information may be intentionally or inadvertently tipped to you.  Your livelihood and liberty may depend on how well you understand your legal obligations when that happens.  Fortunately, when you have questions about the rules regarding insider trading, we’re here to assist.

 

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York and Winston-Salem offices. Clay Wheeler is a partner in Kilpatrick’s Raleigh and Winston-Salem officesJohn Sanders is an associate based in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

 

[1] Greg Stohr and Patricia Hurtado, The Supreme Court Will Hear Its First Insider-Trading Case in 20 Years, Bloomberg (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-10-04/wall-street-watching-as-u-s-high-court-tackles-insider-trading.

[2] 15 U.S.C. 78j (2016).

[3] 17 CFR 270.10b-5 (2016).

[4] Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

[5] U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997).

[6] SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2012).

[7] O’Hagan, at 642.

[8] Id.

[9] Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

[10] Id. at 646.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 647.

[15] James D. Zirin, American Bar Association, The Mother Court: A.K.A., the Southern District Court of New York, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/tyl/topics/legal-history/the-mother-court-aka-southern-district-court-new-york.html

[16] U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014)

[17] Id. at 443.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 450.

[20] Jon Eisenberg, How the United States v. Newman Changes the Law, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (May 3, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/03/how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law/.

[21] Salman v. U.S., available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwihloXYvu_QAhVBjpAKHflsCIIQFggjMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.supremecourt.gov%2Fopinions%2F16pdf%2F15-628_m6ho.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGY28IXIk-a-h-Nuvi5EXSHC6XW6g&sig2=Ydo5oy44CzIMDuCxjMluzA&bvm=bv.141320020,d.eWE (The opinion presents and rejects this argument from Salman before stating that the rule from Newman is inconsistent with precedent)

[22] Greg Stohr and Patricia Hurtado, The Supreme Court Will Hear Its First Insider-Trading Case in 20 Years, Bloomberg (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-10-04/wall-street-watching-as-u-s-high-court-tackles-insider-trading.

[23] Patricia Hurtado, SAC Capital’s Steinberg Gets Insider Trading Charges Dropped, Bloomberg (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-22/u-s-drops-charges-against-sac-capital-s-michael-steinberg.

[24] Salman, supra note 21.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

Posted on Thursday, November 10 2016 at 2:03 pm by

Revised Form ADV: What CCOs Need to Know

By Paul Foley and John Sanders of Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton

On Aug. 25, 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted final rules intended to update and enhance the disclosure requirements promulgated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940—primarily by revising Form ADV. The final rules, which became effective on October 31, 2016 and have a compliance date of Oct. 1, 2017, are substantial and wide-ranging, and chief compliance officers should take note both of their provisions and the potential implementation issues they raise.

INCREASE IN SMA DISCLOSURES

Among the most significant amendments to Form ADV are those related to the disclosure of assets held in separately managed accounts. Advisers will now be required to disclose the approximate percentage of SMA assets that are invested in 12 broad asset categories, including exchange-traded equity securities, U.S. government bonds and derivatives.

This classification requirement presents a practical concern as certain SMA assets may not fit squarely within a single category. The SEC will allow advisers to use their own classification methodology for such assets, “so long as their methodologies are consistently applied and consistent with information the advisers report internally.” But what sounds like well-intentioned deference may not be as beneficial to advisers as it seems. In fact, it may trap unwary advisers, leaving them unable to change internal classification methodologies later.

Perhaps more surprisingly, the new SMA disclosure requirements may be of marginal utility with respect to SMAs holding significant interests in funds, such as exchange-traded funds, mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity funds. Indeed, despite the wide variations among fund asset allocations, the amendments only require advisers to disclose the amount of fund assets held in SMAs. Advisers are expressly told not to look through such funds with respect to the underlying exposure to the various asset categories.

The lack of a look-through mechanism means that the SEC and current and potential advisory clients may garner little information from the new disclosure requirements. This is particularly true with respect to advisers that primarily use funds in SMAs.

For example, if nearly all of an adviser’s SMA assets are invested in funds, the new disclosure requirements will provide almost no meaningful insight regarding the risk, diversification or strategies used by the adviser in SMAs. This issue will only grow more pronounced as advisers increasingly use ETFs and other fund-based strategies.

UMBRELLA REGISTRATION

Another noteworthy amendment to Form ADV tries to make umbrella registration more efficient. The SEC first allowed umbrella registration through no-action letter guidance in response to the new adviser registration requirements set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act. Today, around 743 filing advisers and 2,587 relying advisers are using umbrella registrations. The SEC believes this represents nearly all advisers entitled to use umbrella registration.

With umbrella registration already in extensive use, the true effect of these amendments is to codify the conditions that must be met before it can be employed. According to the SEC, this was done “to limit eligibility for umbrella registration to groups of private fund advisers that operate as a single advisory business.”

The Commission received a number of comment letters regarding umbrella registration that favored relaxing the requirements. Specifically, some objected to the condition that the filing adviser and relying advisers operate under a single code of ethics and a single set of written policies and procedures administered by a single CCO. But the SEC did not alter its position.

The agency’s focus on limiting the applicability of umbrella registration did not address a surprisingly popular practice whereby one or more advisers under common control, but organized as distinct entities, avoid registration entirely. In such circumstances, advisers specifically do not meet the requirements for umbrella registration and each adviser tries to rely on its own exemption from registration. This seems like a missed opportunity by the SEC to address a practice that one could argue is simply doing indirectly what is prohibited from being done directly.

SOCIAL MEDIA DISCLOSURE

Nestled among the amendments that will impact advisers immediately is one that, although somewhat significant today, will likely become even more important over time. Form ADV now requires disclosure of the adviser’s social media accounts and the address of each of the adviser’s social media pages. The SEC plans to use this information to prepare for examinations of advisers and compare information that advisers disseminate across different platforms.

We anticipate that SEC examiners will have heightened interest in advisers’ use of social media. Moreover, we believe this additional disclosure will lead to significantly more deficiencies and, potentially, enforcement related to the adviser recordkeeping and performance marketing rules.

CLARIFYING AMENDMENT AND TECHNICAL CHANGES

In addition to the changes discussed above, the SEC has made numerous amendments designed to clarify Form ADV and its instructions. Although the clarifying and technical amendments are too numerous to cover adequately here, an overview of the changes to Item 7, which the SEC revised significantly, provides an illustrative example.

Item 7.A., which requires advisers to disclose whether their related persons fall within certain financial industry categories, will now state that advisers need not disclose that some of their employees perform investment advisory functions or are registered representatives of a broker/dealer, since this information is reported elsewhere in Form ADV.

In a similar vein, Item 7.B asks whether an adviser serves as an adviser to a private fund and Section 7.B.(1) is where further information is provided. The SEC has added an explanation that Section 7.B.(1) of Schedule D should not be completed for a fund if another registered adviser or SEC-exempt reporting adviser reports the information. These amendments are likely to improve the overall quality of disclosure in Form ADV by making it more consistent among advisers.

BOOKS AND RECORD RULES

The SEC has also amended Rule 204-2, the books and records rule, under the Advisers Act. Rule 204-2(a)(16), which at present requires advisers to maintain records supporting performance claims in communications that are distributed to 10 or more persons, will now require records to be maintained for any performance claims distributed to any person.

In addition, Rule 204-2(a)(7) will now require advisers to maintain originals of all written communications received and copies of all written communications sent by an adviser relating to the performance or rate of return of any managed accounts or other securities recommendations. We believe these amendments to the books and records rule will have a limited impact on advisers because most advisers already maintain this information.

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York office. John Sanders is an associate based in the firm’s Winston-Salem, North Carolina office.

Posted on Friday, October 14 2016 at 1:05 pm by

SEC Reports on Fiscal Year 2016 Enforcement Actions

On October 12, 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), announced its enforcement results for the 2016 fiscal year.[1]  For all but the most dedicated followers of the SEC’s recent uptick in enforcement activities, the results are eye opening.

The Numbers

In 2016, the SEC filed a record 868 enforcement actions against a wide-range of actors.[2]  This represents a jump of over 7.5% from 2015 and 15% from 2014.[3]  The Wall Street Journal linked the record-breaking year to SEC Chair Mary Jo White’s “broken windows” strategy of pursuing “the smallest legal violations” as well as the serious, headline-grabbing frauds.[4]  The effect, Chair White says, “makes you feel like we are everywhere.”[5]

Not only was the SEC able to increase the number of enforcement actions filed in 2016, it also was successful in obtaining over $4 Billion in disgorgements and penalties through favorable orders, settlements, and judgements.[6]

Insider Trading

Several of the highlighted enforcement actions for the year involve a point of perpetual emphasis for the SEC: insider trading.[7]  In 2016, nearly 10% of all enforcement actions brought were related to insider trading.  Several of those stemmed from what the SEC described as “complex insider trading rings” uncovered through “innovative uses of data and analytics.”[8]

One illustration of a complex insider trading ring involves two hedge fund managers and a former government official.[9]  The former government official allegedly used deception, concealing his role as a hedge fund consultant, to obtain confidential information about upcoming approvals of generic drug applications from former colleagues at the Food and Drug Administration.[10]  The SEC alleged that one of the hedge fund managers made unlawful profits of nearly $32 million by insider trading on tips he received from the scheme.[11]

Investment Advisers

The SEC also revealed that investment advisers were a primary target of SEC enforcement actions in 2016.[12]  In fact, nearly 20% of enforcement actions brought during the year, were brought against investment advisers and investment companies.[13]  This was another SEC record.[14]

Those who have been following the SEC under Chair White are not surprised by the surge in enforcement actions against investment advisers.[15]  Chair White has moved examiners from the broker-dealer unit to the investment adviser unit of the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations in recent years.[16]  Chair White has directed the enlarged staff to examine issues that generate conflicts of interest, such as cybersecurity policies and financial incentives.[17]

In a special section of the press release, the SEC highlighted some of its enforcements actions against advisers.[18]  Among the highlights are eight actions related to private equity fund advisers.[19]  Some of the entities and individuals involved are giants in the private equity industry:  Blackstone Group,[20] Fenway Partners,[21] and WL Ross & Co.[22]  Each paid fines related to its failure to adequately disclose certain fee arrangements.

The SEC also brought an enforcement action against three AIG affiliates which earned fees for steering clients into share classes of mutual funds that charged 12b-1 fees when the clients were eligible for share classes that did not charge such fees. In a release announcing the settlement of those claims, the SEC warned that “investment advisers must be vigilant about conflicts of interest when selecting mutual fund share classes.”[23]  This mix of actions against investment advisers is an example of how the SEC’s broken windows approach creates the appearance of comprehensive enforcement.

New Tools

In reviewing the results of this record-setting year, industry participants should note what the SEC credits for its success. Chair Mary Jo White states that the SEC is “using new data analytics to uncover fraud, enhancing [the SEC’s] ability to litigate tough cases, and expanding the playbook bringing novel and significant actions to better protect investors and our markets.”[24]

Analytical technology is something that the SEC has been developing for several years.[25]  The Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS), introduced in 2013, gives the SEC greater ability to reconstruct market data time-stamped to the micro-second.[26]  Efforts to build the Consolidated Order Trail are still ongoing.[27]  However, once that is on-line, the SEC should become even better at selecting and winning enforcement actions.

Conclusion

It is understandable if securities professionals reading these results do, in fact, feel that the SEC is everywhere these days. These results should trigger a recommitment to regulatory compliance that includes doing the little things right.  We’re here to help.

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York and Winston-Salem offices. John Sanders is an associate in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

[1] SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2016 (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html.

[2] Id.

[3] Jean Eaglesham, WALL ST. J., SEC Breaks Record for Number of Enforcement Cases (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-on-track-to-break-record-for-number-of-enforcement-cases-1476198436.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Thomas O. Gorman, LEXIS NEXIS, Priorities for the SEC’s Enforcement Division (March 23, 2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/securities/b/securities/archive/2015/03/23/priorities-for-the-sec-s-enforcement-division.aspx.

[8] SEC, supra note 1.

[9] Id.

[10] Jonathan Stempel, REUTERS, Visium’s Valvani Charged With Insider Trading (June 16, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fraud-insidertrading-idUSKCN0Z11TB.

[11] SEC, supra note 1.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Eaglesham, supra note 3.

[15] Kenneth Corbin, FINANCIAL PLANNING, SEC Brings Record Number of Enforcement Actions Against Advisers (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/sec-brings-record-number-of-enforcement-actions-against-advisers.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] SEC, supra note 1.

[19] Id.

[20] SEC, Blackstone Charged With Disclosure Failures (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-235.html.

[21] SEC, SEC Charges Private Equity Firm and Four Executives With Failing to Disclose Conflicts of Interest (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-250.html.

[22] CNBC, SEC Fines Wilbur Ross’ Firm $2.3 Million Over Fees (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/25/sec-fines-wilbur-ross-firm-23-million-over-fees.html.

[23] SEC, AIG Affiliates Charged With Mutual Fund Shares Conflicts (March 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-52.html.

[24] SEC, supra note 1.

[25] Elisse Walter, Chairman, SEC, Harnessing Tomorrow’s Technology for Today’s Investors and Markets (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492300.

[26] SEC, MIDAS: Market Information Data Analytics System, https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/midas.html.

[27] Rob Tricchinelli, BLOOMBERG BNA, SEC Releases Consolidated Audit Trail Plan (April 28, 2016), http://www.bna.com/sec-releases-consolidated-n57982070430/.

Posted on Friday, February 28 2014 at 9:32 pm by

SEC Provides No-Action Relief for M&A Brokers

On January 31, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a no-action letter (“No-Action Letter”) [1] permitting an “M&A Broker”, under certain circumstances, to facilitate mergers, acquisitions, business sales, and business combinations (together, “M&A Transactions”) in connection with the transfer of ownership of a “privately-held company” (any company that does not have any class of securities registered, or required to be registered, with the SEC under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is not required to file periodic information, documents, or reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act) without the M&A Broker registering as a broker-dealer under section 15(b) of the Exchange Act. The specific terms and conditions in the No-Action Letter are outlined below.

While the details of the definition of M&A Broker are complicated, the No-Action Letter has caught the securities industry by surprise. The No-Action Letter provides a potential exemption from SEC broker-dealer registration for many M&A industry consultants commonly referred to as “business brokers”, even if they are paid “finders” or “success” fees for securities-based M&A transactions between privately-held companies. In particular, the No-Action Letter permits an M&A Broker [2] to (i) advertise a privately-held company for sale with information such as the description of the business, general location, and price range, (ii) participate in the negotiations of the M&A Transaction, (iii) advise the parties to issue securities, or otherwise to effect the transfer of the business by means of securities, or assess the value of any securities sold, and (iv) receive transaction-based or other compensation, without registering as a broker-dealer with the SEC.

In particular, the SEC noted the following regarding M&A Brokers:

  • M&A Brokers may not have the ability to bind a party to an M&A Transaction.
  • M&A Brokers may not directly, or indirectly through any of its affiliates, provide financing for an M&A Transaction.
  • M&A Brokers may not have custody, control, or possession of or otherwise handle funds or securities issued or exchanged in connection with an M&A Transaction or other securities transaction for the account of others.
  • M&A Transactions may not involve a public offering, but instead must be conducted in compliance with an applicable exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.
  • No party to any M&A Transaction may be a “shell company”,[3] other than a “business combination related shell company”.[4]
  • M&A Brokers representing both buyers and sellers must provide clear written disclosure as to the parties represented and obtain written consent from both parties to the joint representation. In addition, an M&A Broker facilitating an M&A Transaction with a group of buyers may do so only if the group is formed without the assistance of the M&A Broker.
  • The buyer, or group of buyers, in any M&A Transaction must, upon completion of the M&A Transaction, control and actively operate the company or the business conducted with the assets of the business.[5]
  • No M&A Transaction may result in the transfer of interests to a passive buyer or group of passive buyers.
  • Any securities received by the buyer or M&A Broker in an M&A Transaction will be restricted securities within the meaning of Rule 144(a)(3) under the Securities Act because the securities would have been issued in a transaction not involving a public offering.
  • M&A Brokers and each officer, director or employee of an M&A Broker: (i) cannot have been barred from association with a broker­dealer by the SEC, any state or any self-regulatory organization; and (ii) may not be suspended from association with a broker-dealer.

Future Considerations

The No-Action Letter is a welcome step towards clarifying the registration requirements for M&A Brokers; however, it remains to be seen what, if any, effect it will have on determinations under state securities laws and their varied definitions of “brokers”, “dealers” and “finders”. Although it is reasonable to assume that states that have adopted laws similar to federal law in this area may likewise adopt the interpretation presented in the No-Action Letter, only time will tell if this proves to be the case. We also recommend that individuals and companies looking to rely on the No-Action Letter to avoid SEC broker-dealer registration carefully consider the No-Action Letter’s requirements for transactions to fit under its parameters (namely, the requirements that qualifying transactions involve a buyer that will take voting control, assume executive officer or management positions or otherwise have the power to exert control over the seller after the transaction). Additionally, we note that the No-Action Letter does not address continuing issues regarding broker-dealer registration of private equity fund advisers that receive deal-based fees, who likely would not be able to comply with the M&A Broker definition. Nevertheless, the No-Action Letter’s stark departure from the SEC’s historical position that transaction-based compensation is the “hallmark of broker-dealer activity” is a positive step towards addressing, at the federal level, at least some of these issues.

For more information on the No-Action Letter, please contact any member of the Investment Management Team.


[1] SEC No-Action Letter re: M&A Brokers, dated January 31, 2014. A copy of the No-Action Letter is available here.

[2] An “M&A Broker” is defined in the No-Action Letter as a person engaged in the business of effecting securities transactions solely in connection with the transfer of ownership and control of a privately-held company (defined below) through the purchase, sale, exchange, issuance, repurchase, or redemption of, or a business combination involving, securities or assets of the company, to a buyer that will actively operate the company or its assets, whether through the power to elect officers and approve budgets or by service as an executive or other executive manager, among other things.

[3] A “shell” company is defined in the No-Action Letter as a company that: (1) has no or nominal operations; and (2) has: (i) no or nominal assets; (ii) assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents; or (iii) assets consisting of any amount of cash and cash equivalents and nominal other assets. In this context, a going concern need not be profitable, and could even be emerging from bankruptcy, so long as it has actually been conducting business, including soliciting or effecting business transactions or engaging in research and development activities.

[4] A “business combination related shell company” is defined in the No-Action Letter as a shell company (as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act) that is (1) formed by an entity that is not a shell company solely for the purpose of changing the corporate domicile of that entity solely within the United States or (2) formed by an entity defined in Securities Act Rule 165(f) among one or more entities other than the shell company, none of which is a shell company.

[5] A buyer, or group of buyers collectively, would have the necessary control if it has the power, directly or indirectly, to direct the management or policies of a company, whether through ownership of securities, by contract, or otherwise. The necessary control will be presumed to exist if, upon completion of the transaction, the buyer or group of buyers has the right to vote 25% or more of a class of voting securities; has the power to sell or direct the sale of 25% or more of a class of voting securities; or in the case of a partnership or limited liability company, has the right to receive upon dissolution or has contributed 25% or more of the capital. In addition, the buyer, or group of buyers, must actively operate the company or the business conducted with the assets of the company.

 

 

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