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Posted on Friday, December 16 2016 at 11:51 am by

7 Securities Law and Regulatory Changes Likely to be Considered During the Trump Administration

By Paul Foley and John Sanders

On November 8, 2016, political power in United States shifted in an unexpected and unprecedented way.  As of January 20, 2017, Republicans will hold the White House and both Houses of Congress.[1]  President-elect Donald Trump will also have the opportunity to appoint two SEC Commissioners and a new Chair.[2]  He and his party will have the ability to reshape securities law and regulation.  As this was unanticipated, there was little discussion before the election as to what it would mean for securities law and regulation.  We believe the following seven issues are likely to be part of the discussion in the weeks and months ahead.

1. Dodd-Frank Act – Volcker Rule

The Volcker Rule, a 900-plus-page rule adopted in December 2013, was intended to limit proprietary trading by banks.[3]  Championed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, the rule was a last-minute addition to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.  For years, it stalled as regulators and commentators tried to distinguish between speculation (deemed bad) from investment (deemed good).  Few believe that the regulators were successful in properly drawing this distinction.[4]  Making the rule more susceptible to criticism, many experts have determined the rule “would have done nothing to mitigate [the Great Recession,] the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.”[5]

President-elect Trump’s nominee for Secretary of the Treasury has promised “strip back” elements of the Dodd-Frank Act, including the Volcker Rule.[6]  If the new administration is dedicated to repealing the Volcker Rule, something that isn’t quite clear,[7] repealing it won’t be easy.  Legislative action would likely require bipartisan support in the Senate.[8]  Eliminating the rule through agency rule making, like adopting the rule, would require coordination between multiple independent agencies,[9] an opportunity for public comment,[10] and time.[11]  The easier (but less permanent) solution is for the new President to appoint agency heads who will interpret the rule differently or deemphasize its enforcement.[12]  The discussion of whether, and how, to repeal the Volcker Rule should be followed closely.

2. Delegated Authority for Enforcement

In 2009, the SEC delegated authority to the Director of Enforcement to open formal orders of investigation of persons and entities.[13]  The Director of Enforcement then took the unprecedented step of sub-delegating authority to Regional Directors, Associate Directors, and Specialized Unit Chiefs.[14]  The delegation supports Chair White’s “broken windows” approach by which deficiencies and misconduct of every size and nature are addressed.[15]  This approach has resulted in a record number of enforcement proceedings.[16]  However, many commentators have raised concerns about the ease with which proceedings can be brought and subpoenas issued and whether enforcement is now less effective because it is uncoordinated.[17]  If the new administration wishes to end the delegation, it can appoint SEC Commissioners and a Chair that will withdraw the delegation with an order[18] not subject to the lengthy formal rule making process.[19]

3. Fiduciary Rule

The Department of Labor (the “DOL”) finalized the so-called “Fiduciary Rule” in April 2016 and announced it would go into effect in April 2017.[20]  According to the DOL, investors lose billions of dollars in fees each year because their advisors are not acting in their best interests.[21]  The goal of the Fiduciary Rule, therefore, is to “stop advisers from putting their own interests in earning high commissions and fees over clients’ interests in obtaining the best investments at the lowest prices.”[22]  However, the net effect of the rule is unclear.  Among the potential negative effects of the rule are investors losing access to competent advice,[23] skyrocketing costs for affected accounts,[24] decreases of 25 to 50% in annuities sales,[25] and unnecessary corporate restructuring.[26]

If lawsuits aimed at preventing the rule from going into effect fail, those who advocate repealing the rule will find the job challenging.  First, the rule isn’t within the reach of the Congressional Review Act[27] and isn’t likely to be suspended by the Secretary of Labor who oversaw its creation.[28]  That means a lengthy formal rule making process would be required to repeal the rule.[29]  It is uncertain whether this is an effort the investment advisory industry would welcome after spending the past year working toward compliance, which included spinning off business units[30] changing long-standing pricing models,[31] and jettisoning certain clients.[32]

4. Consolidated Audit Trail

In 2010, as the SEC and CFTC attempted to trace the root cause of the Flash Crash, it became abundantly clear that the financial market regulators were ill-equipped to police modern markets.  Out of this realization came the idea for the Consolidated Audit Trail (the “CAT”).[33]  CAT is conceptualized as a market-wide system that tracks equity and option trades.[34]  It would help in both investigations and monitoring.  Proving manipulation and fraud, as well as identifying systemic risk, should become easier with CAT in place.  However, despite years of work, “a fully baked, centralized trail is still years away.”[35]  Given the benefits of an operational CAT to each of the SEC’s mandates, including maintaining the investor confidence that drives investment into our public markets, getting it up and running may be a priority.  However, many commentators argue that CAT would be a hacker’s dream.[36]  The new administration will signal its where it stands on CAT with its appointment of SEC commissioners and Chair.

5. Pay Ratio Disclosures

The Dodd-Frank Act instructed the SEC to adopt a rule requiring each publicly traded company to disclose “the ratio of the compensation of its chief executive officer (CEO) to the median compensation of its employees.”[37]  The ratio would appear in registration statements, proxy and information statements, and annual reports that call for executive compensation disclosure.[38]  This seemingly simple calculation may “actually entail herculean bookkeeping for large, diverse companies.”[39]

The compliance date for the pay ration rule is January 1, 2017.[40]  Once the new Congress and SEC commissioners are in place, authorities should consider whether the rule serves any of the SEC’s three mandates: protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.[41]  If the rule is deemed inappropriate under those mandates, Congress may amend the Dodd-Frank Act and instruct the SEC to engage in a formal rule making process aimed at repealing the rule.  If the rule is deemed appropriate, or the political will to repeal the rule is lacking, it may remain in place with the SEC allowing companies “substantial flexibility in determining the pay ratio.”[42]

6. Political Contributions Disclosures

In 2011, a group of college professors argued that the Supreme Court’s Citizens United[43] ruling necessitated an SEC rule requiring public companies to disclose their political expenditures.[44]  The SEC received more than 1 million public comments – a record.[45]  Yet, the SEC did not act.  Senator Elizabeth Warren, less than a month before the recent election, openly urged President Obama to remove SEC Chair Mary Jo White for refusing “to develop a political spending disclosure rule despite her clear authority to do so.”[46]  This was perhaps a bit unfair.  Not only was the SEC restricted by law from working on the rule at that time,[47] but the rule has faced tremendous opposition.[48]  Business groups and Republicans have long argued that “a company’s political contributions are not related to its financial performance and that the disclosures are unnecessary.”[49]  A Republican Congress or appointments to the SEC may find 2017 is an ideal time to revisit this issue.

7. Liquidity Risk Management

On October 13, 2016, the SEC announced that it had finalized a rule that would require open-ended investment companies to develop liquidity risk management programs and make additional disclosures related to liquidity.[50]  The rule, among other things, requires an investment company’s board of directors to adopt a formal plan for managing liquidity risk and make disclosures classifying fund investments into one of four categories according to liquidity.[51]  In a letter to the SEC supporting the rule, Senator Sherrod Brown cited several sources for the proposition that the fund industry was growing and offering investments in less-liquid assets.[52]  Tellingly, Senator Brown cited widely-available public sources such as Barron’s and Bloomberg articles.[53]  If the public has access to multiple news stories about liquidity risk, risk disclosures in regulatory filings, and lists of fund holdings online, it is fair to ask whether the rule carries a benefit to investors along with its cost.  If the determination is made the costs of this rule substantially outweigh the benefits, then the SEC may engage in a formal rule making process to repeal the rule.

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York and Winston-Salem, North Carolina offices.  John Sanders is an associate based in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

[1] Richard Cowan and Susan Cornwell, Republicans Defend Grip on U.S. Congress as Trump Wins Presidency, Reuters (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-congress-idUSKBN13317Z.

[2] Mark Shoeff Jr., Where Donald Trump Stands on Top Financial Adviser Issues, Investment News (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20161109/FREE/161109909/where-donald-trump-stands-on-top-financial-adviser-issues.

[3] SEC, Final Rule: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/bhca-1.pdf.

[4] The Volcker Ambiguity, The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 11, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304744304579250393935144268.

[5] Ben Steil, Beyond the Volcker Rule: A Better Approach to Financial Reform, Council on Foreign Relations (April 2012), http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/beyond-volcker-rule-better-approach-financial-reform/p27894.

[6] Jacob M. Schlesinger, Trump Treasury Choice Steven Mnuchin Vows to ‘Strip Back’ Dodd-Frank, The Wall Street Journal (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-treasury-choice-steven-mnuchin-vows-to-strip-back-dodd-frank-1480513188.

[7] Emily Stephenson, Trump Calls for ‘21st century’ Glass-Steagall Banking Law, Reuters (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-banks-idUSKCN12Q2WA.

[8] Ryan Tracy and John Carney, How to Kill the Volcker Rule? Don’t Enforce it, The Wall Street Journal (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-kill-the-volcker-rule-dont-enforce-it-1480329002.

[9] Id.

[10] 5 U.S.C. 553 (2016), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/553 (Outlining the process for rule making, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 551 (2016)).

[11] Tracy and Carney, supra note 8.

[12] Id.

[13] SEC, Final Rule: Delegation of Authority to Director of Division of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-60448.pdf.

[14] Bradley J. Bondi, A Questionable Delegation of Authority: Did the SEC Go Too Far When It Delegated Authority to the Division of Enforcement to Initiate an Investigation?, Center for Financial Stability (Sept. 20, 2016), http://centerforfinancialstability.org/wp/2016/09/20/a-questionable-delegation-of-authority-did-the-sec-go-too-far-when-it-delegated-authority-to-the-division-of-enforcement-to-initiate-an-investigation/

[15] Jean Eaglesham, SEC Breaks Record for Number of Enforcement Cases, The Wall Street Journal (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-on-track-to-break-record-for-number-of-enforcement-cases-1476198436.

[16] Id.

[17] Bondi, supra note 14.

[18] 17 CFR 200.30-4 (2016), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/200.30-4.

[19] 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2) (2016), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/553.

[20] Department of Labor, Final Rule: Conflict of Interest Rule (April 8, 2016), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2.

[21] Id.

[22] Liz Skinner, Figuring Out Fiduciary: Now Comes the Hard Part, Investment News (May 9, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160509/FEATURE/160509939/the-dol-fiduciary-rule-will-forever-change-financial-advice-and-the.

[23] Robert Litan & Hal Singer, Obama’s Big Idea for Small Savers: ‘Robo’ Financial Advice, The Wall Street Journal (July 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-big-idea-for-small-savers-robo-financial-advice-1437521976.

[24] Jed Morowitz & Mason Braswell, Exclusive: Merrill to End Commission-Based Retirement Business on Retail Accounts, AdvisorHub (Oct. 6, 2016), http://advisorhub.com/exclusive-merrill-end-commission-based-retirement-business-retail-accounts/.

[25] Skinner, supra note 22.

[26] Christine Idzelis, Sale of AIG Advisor Group May Signal Wave of Mergers Ahead, Investment News (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160129/FREE/160129906/sale-of-aig-advisor-group-may-signal-wave-of-mergers-ahead.

[27] 5 U.S.C. 801 (2016), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/801.

[28] Aaron Back, Eliminating Obama’s Fiduciary Rule Easier Said Than Done, The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eliminating-obamas-fiduciary-rule-easier-said-than-done-1480976385.

[29] 5 U.S.C. 553 (2016), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/553 (Outlining the process for rule making, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 551 (2016)).

[30] Greg Iacurci, Insurance Based Broker-Dealers Plan to Use BICE Under DOL Fiduciary Rule, Investment News (July 7, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160707/FREE/160709959/insurance-based-broker-dealers-plan-to-use-bice-under-dol-fiduciary.

[31] Id.

[32] Andrew Welsch, Raymond James follows Morgan’s Lead in Keeping Commissions Under Fiduciary, OnWallStreet (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/raymond-james-follows-morgans-lead-in-keeping-commissions-under-dol; See also Robert Powell, New Rules Force Financial Advisers to do What’s Best for their Clients, USA Today (April 6, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/powell/2016/04/06/investors-new-fiduciary-rule-protection/82661384/.

[33] SEC, Final Rule: Consolidated Trail (July 18, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67457.pdf.

[34] Nick Fera, What New Developments in the Consolidated Audit Trail Spell for Broker-Dealer Compliance, The Street (June 13, 2016), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13604582/1/what-new-developments-in-the-consolidated-audit-trail-spell-for-broker-dealer-compliance.html.

[35] Id.

[36] Dave Michaels, SEC Approves Consolidated Audit Trail to Detect Market Manipulation, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-vote-on-consolidated-audit-trail-to-detect-market-manipulation-1479240411.

[37] SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.

[38] Id.

[39] Richard Levick, The Pay Ratio Rule:  Businesses Face Unprecedented Executive Pay Disclosure Burden (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2016/02/09/the-pay-ratio-rule-businesses-face-unprecedented-executive-pay-disclosure-burden/#a044585cf077.

[40] SEC, Final Rule: Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015),  https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.

[41] SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.

[42] SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.

[43] Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

[44] Committee of Corporate Political Spending, Rulemaking Petition to SEC (Aug 3, 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.

[45] Ranee Merle and Jim Tankersley, Elizabeth Warren Urges President Obama to Remove the Head of the SEC, The Washington Post (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/14/elizabeth-warren-asks-president-obama-to-remove-the-head-of-the-sec/.

[46] Id.

[47] Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 3030 (2016), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2029/text (stating that no funds made available under the Consolidated Appropriations Act would “be used by the [SEC] to finalize, issue, or implement any rule, regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of political contributions.”)

[48] Andrew Ackerman, Elizabeth Warren to Obama: Fire SEC Chief Mary Jo White, The Wall Street Journal,  (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-to-obama-fire-sec-chief-mary-jo-white-1476439200.

[49] Merle and Tankersley, supra note 45.

[50] SEC, Final Rule: Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/33-10233.pdf.

[51] Id.

[52] Letter from U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown to SEC Chair Mary Jo White (July 6, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-15/s72415-247.pdf.

[53] Id.

Posted on Thursday, December 15 2016 at 9:28 am by

Supreme Court Confirms Expansive View of Insider Trading

By Paul Foley, Clay Wheeler, and John Sanders

Perhaps the most serious charge that could be leveled against a reader of this blog is that of being engaged in or associated with “insider trading.”  The allegation alone is enough to derail or end a promising career.  Successful compliance requires an understanding of the law and your obligations under it.  In light of recent developments regarding insider trading, including the first Supreme Court decision to address the crime in 20 years,[1] we encourage you to read this article in its entirety and contact us with any questions you may have.

Insider Trading:  The Tradition

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934[2] and Rule 10b-5[3] promulgated thereunder prohibit insider trading.  The basic elements of insider trading are:  (i) engaging in a securities transaction, (ii) while in possession of material, non-public information, (iii) in violation of a duty to refrain from doing so.

The paradigm case discussing the so-called “classical” theory of insider trading is Chiarella v. U.S.[4]  In Chiarella, an employee of a publishing firm was charged with insider trading after using advance notice of a takeover bid to trade.  Chiarella’s conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court after the Court focused on the requirement of a duty running from the trader to the shareholders of the corporate entity “owning” the material, non-public information.  Thus, a successful prosecution under the classical theory usually involves a corporate insider trading in shares of his or her employer while in possession of material, non-public information (e.g., advance notice of a merger).

After Chiarella, an important development in the law has been the extension of liability to persons who receive tips from insiders, i.e., individuals whose duty to refrain from trading is derived or inherited from the corporate insider’s duty.  Thus, not only may insiders be liable for insider trading under rule 10b-5, but those to whom they pass tips, either directly (tippees) or through others (remote tippees) may be liable if they trade on such tips.  Because tippee and remote tippee liability is more difficult to grasp and more likely to affect our readers, this article will primarily, but not exclusively, focus on individuals in those circumstances.

In a pattern that has repeated itself over the years, courts broadened the scope of insider trading by developing a second, “complementary”[5] theory of insider trading – the “misappropriation” theory.  This theory “targets person[s] who are not corporate insiders but to whom material non-public information has been entrusted in confidence and who breach a fiduciary duty to the source of the information to gain personal profit in the securities market.”[6]  The seminal case in the articulation of the misappropriation theory is U.S. v. O’Hagan.  In O’Hagan, a partner at a large law firm (but not ours) obtained and traded on information given to attorneys in the firm who were representing a client in a tender offer.  The Supreme Court held that “A person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”[7]  In practical terms, under the misappropriation theory, individuals who come into possession of material, non-public information while providing services to corporate clients, such as the attorney in O’Hagan [8] may be held liable.

Joining Chiarella and O’Hagan in making up the traditional core of insider trading law is Dirks v. SEC.[9]  In Dirks, the Supreme Court attempted to set a limit on the scope of insider trading.[10]  Dirks was a securities analyst who learned from a former insurance company insider that the company was committing fraud and was on the verge of financial ruin.[11]  Dirks investigated and disclosed this information to several people, including a reporter and clients who traded on the information.[12]  Dirks was held liable for insider trading, but appealed.[13]  The overturning of Dirks’s liability centered on the fact that the corporate insider had disclosed the fraud to Dirks purely by a desire to expose the fraud, rather than to obtain any financial or other personal benefit.  The Court held:

In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider’s “tip” constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.  Whether disclosure is a breach of duty depends in large part on the personal benefit the insider receives as a result of the disclosure.  Absent an improper purpose, there is no breach of duty to stockholders.  And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.[14]

Furthermore, Dirks introduced the idea that a tippee has to be actually aware of the tipper’s breach or presented with sufficient facts so that the tippee will be deemed aware.  In this way, Dirks created a “personal benefit” element related to the tipper.  After Dirks, prosecutors were generally confident they could prove this benefit existed as long as there was a quid pro quo or a moderately close relationship between tipper and tippee.

Newman:  A Disruption

Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Dirks guided the law of insider trading largely uninterrupted for nearly 20 years.  Then came a decision from the Second Circuit, the so-called “Mother Court”[15] of securities law, but an underling of the Supreme Court, called U.S. v. Newman.[16]

Newman involved a hedge fund portfolio manager who was part of an information-sharing cohort of analysts and portfolio managers.[17]  By the time Newman received the tip, he was “four levels removed from the insider tippers,” (i.e., a remote tippee).[18]  The tippers were insiders at technology companies who had provided information to what the court termed “casual acquaintances,” who in turn passed those tips on.  Citing Dirks repeatedly for support, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that government must prove the tipper received “a personal benefit” and that the tippee knew of that benefit.[19]

In Newman, the Second Circuit concluded that “the mere fact of friendship” was insufficient to give rise to the required personal benefit to the tipper.  Instead, the court required “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”  Despite the fact that the 2nd Circuit cited its adherence to Dirks in overturning Newman’s conviction, it was clear to all that by raising the bar for the evidence required to meet the Dirks “personal benefit” requirement, the opinion suggested a serious new limitation on insider trading law.  Moreover, the prosecutors were denied a rehearing en banc and a Supreme Court writ of certiorari.  This meant Newman would remain law in the most significant federal circuit for securities law until further notice.

One attorney called Newman “a well-deserved generational setback for the Government.”[20]  The predicted effect of Newman was that the government would be forced to prove that someone charged with insider trading knew that she was trading on non-public, material information and that “the tipper’s goal in disclosing information is to obtain money, property, or something of tangible value.”[21]  This heightened burden led to the reversal of more than a dozen insider trading convictions,[22] and pending cases were dropped.[23]

Salman:  The Expansive View of Insider Trading Strikes Back

Newman’s holding concerning what qualifies as a personal benefit to the tipper was reversed last week when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Salman v. United States.[24]  Before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, in Salman, only the most ardent securities law gurus followed the case.  So, some background may be helpful.  Salman was convicted after trading on material, non-public information received from a friend, who had received the information from Salman’s brother-in-law.  Thus, Salman was prosecuted as a remote tippee.  He argued that he could not “be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his brother-in-law, who worked on M&A matters at an investment bank) did not personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips.”[25]

In a strong rebuke, the Supreme Court held, “To the extent that the Second Circuit in Newman held that the tipper must also receive something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to a trading relative, that rule is inconsistent with Dirks.[26]  Justice Alito succinctly explained “a tippee’s liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty” and that duty is breached “when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal benefit.”[27]  Such a personal benefit can be inferred where the tip is made “to a trading relative or friend.”[28]

Why Salman Matters

By allowing a generous inference of a benefit to the tipper based on a personal relationship alone, the Supreme Court in Salman reestablished the old order of things – an expansive scope for insider trading prosecutions.  We understand that investment advisers are more likely than others to come into contact with corporate insiders, as well as those with whom corporate insiders speak in confidence.  You know these individuals as professionals, former schoolmates, and even friends and family members.  In discussing your work, it is quite possible that non-public, material information may be intentionally or inadvertently tipped to you.  Your livelihood and liberty may depend on how well you understand your legal obligations when that happens.  Fortunately, when you have questions about the rules regarding insider trading, we’re here to assist.

 

Paul Foley is a partner with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton’s New York and Winston-Salem offices. Clay Wheeler is a partner in Kilpatrick’s Raleigh and Winston-Salem officesJohn Sanders is an associate based in the firm’s Winston-Salem office.

 

[1] Greg Stohr and Patricia Hurtado, The Supreme Court Will Hear Its First Insider-Trading Case in 20 Years, Bloomberg (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-10-04/wall-street-watching-as-u-s-high-court-tackles-insider-trading.

[2] 15 U.S.C. 78j (2016).

[3] 17 CFR 270.10b-5 (2016).

[4] Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

[5] U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997).

[6] SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 2012).

[7] O’Hagan, at 642.

[8] Id.

[9] Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

[10] Id. at 646.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 647.

[15] James D. Zirin, American Bar Association, The Mother Court: A.K.A., the Southern District Court of New York, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/tyl/topics/legal-history/the-mother-court-aka-southern-district-court-new-york.html

[16] U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014)

[17] Id. at 443.

[18] Id.

[19] Id. at 450.

[20] Jon Eisenberg, How the United States v. Newman Changes the Law, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (May 3, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/03/how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law/.

[21] Salman v. U.S., available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwihloXYvu_QAhVBjpAKHflsCIIQFggjMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.supremecourt.gov%2Fopinions%2F16pdf%2F15-628_m6ho.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGY28IXIk-a-h-Nuvi5EXSHC6XW6g&sig2=Ydo5oy44CzIMDuCxjMluzA&bvm=bv.141320020,d.eWE (The opinion presents and rejects this argument from Salman before stating that the rule from Newman is inconsistent with precedent)

[22] Greg Stohr and Patricia Hurtado, The Supreme Court Will Hear Its First Insider-Trading Case in 20 Years, Bloomberg (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-10-04/wall-street-watching-as-u-s-high-court-tackles-insider-trading.

[23] Patricia Hurtado, SAC Capital’s Steinberg Gets Insider Trading Charges Dropped, Bloomberg (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-22/u-s-drops-charges-against-sac-capital-s-michael-steinberg.

[24] Salman, supra note 21.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

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